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Abstract: In November 2013, mass protests broke out in Ukraine when President Yanu-
kovych chose not to sign a planned Association Agreement with the European Union. Kyiv’s 
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) became ‘EuroMaidan’ as huge crowds of de-
monstrators expressed their anger at the government. This essay examines the part played by 
journalists during EuroMaidan and the struggles around media resources that were central to 
these dramatic recent events in Ukrainian politics. Attention is devoted to journalist activism 
and use of social networks; the emergence of new information sources; and the behaviour of 
leading national TV channels. Attempts to suppress anti-government narratives are described 
and their impact assessed. The essay identifies three weaknesses which combined to under-
mine Yanukovych’s position in the ‘battle for the narrative’: (1) dissent and activism among 
Ukraine’s professional journalist community; (2) the autonomous nature and increasing ac-
cessibility of online communication; and (3) the sensitivity of media-owning oligarchs to 
public and international opinion. 
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n late 2013 the decision of President Viktor Yanukovych not to sign a planned Association 
Agreement with the European Union (EU) sparked the largest mass demonstrations seen in 
Ukraine since the Orange revolution. News that the deal with the EU had been suspended 
broke on Thursday 21 November. Within hours, prominent journalists and bloggers were 
using social networks to rally protesters; around 1,500 people gathered that evening on Ky-
iv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) to express their anger at the government. 
By the weekend of 24–25 November, many tens of thousands were on the streets, not only in 
Kyiv but across the country (BBC News 2013). An attempt to disperse demonstrators vio-
lently on 30 November only boosted public support for the protest movement when national 
television and other media broadcast footage of the police brutality. Maidan Nezalezhnosti, 
redubbed ‘EuroMaidan’, remained occupied by anti-government crowds until the battle with 
the authorities culminated in fatal clashes and a major shake-up of Ukraine’s political land-
scape. The consequences are still unfolding at the time of writing.  
I  
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This essay examines the part played by professional journalists during EuroMaidan and 
the struggles around media resources which were central to these dramatic recent events in 
Ukrainian politics. In line with trends observed elsewhere in the world (White and McAllister 
2014), ‘new’ and social media were important mobilizational tools used to coordinate 
demonstrations and challenge the narrative of the state authorities. Yet sympathetic coverage 
of EuroMaidan was not confined to the internet. For several weeks, most of the country’s 
biggest TV channels – owned by oligarchs, some with close ties to the Yanukovych admin-
istration – enjoyed an unexpected ‘excursion into objectivity’ (Myselyuk, 2014). Rather than 
downplaying or denigrating EuroMaidan, they boosted their political news output and trans-
mitted powerful live images of the protests to millions of viewers. Indeed, by mid-December 
Ukrainian Prime Minister Mykola Azarov found himself complaining that the government’s 
voice was ‘inaudible’ (ZN.ua 2013), suggesting a quite bizarre role reversal within the re-
gional context. Yanukovych and his team had taken various steps to increase their influence 
over Ukraine’s information environment since 2010,1 but for the first few weeks of Euro-
Maidan they were overwhelmed nevertheless. 
How can we explain this breakdown in presidential and governmental control over the 
news agenda? What tactics did the authorities employ to reassert themselves in the media 
sphere and to what effect? This essay addresses these questions and identifies three interre-
lated factors which combined to undermine Yanukovych’s position in the ‘battle for the nar-
rative’, i.e. the battle to determine how EuroMaidan was presented in the media to the 
Ukrainian public. The factors identified are (1) dissent and activism among Ukraine’s profes-
sional journalist community; (2) the autonomous nature and increasing accessibility of online 
communication; and (3) the sensitivity of media-owning oligarchs to public and international 
opinion. Political pressure and personnel changes did succeed in bringing some TV coverage 
back ‘on-message’ for the president, most notably at leading channel Inter. However, at-
tempts to neutralise critical voices through intimidation and repression (e.g. use of riot police 
against reporters and the beating of opposition journalist Tetyana Chornovol by unidentified 
assailants) ultimately backfired on the Yanukovych administration. The brutality was not 
only exposed and condemned on the internet; it was also publicized to varying degrees by 
Ukraine’s established TV channels, whose oligarch owners risked incurring public wrath and 
possible international sanctions if the media under their control deliberately neglected to re-
port information of public interest that was available online. 
The essay begins with a brief introduction to the Ukrainian media environment, its domi-
nant oligarch media proprietors and its evolution during the Yanukovych presidency. The 
main section then examines and seeks to explain online and offline media reaction which 
followed the breakdown of talks with the EU. Attention is devoted to journalist activism and 
use of social networks, the emergence of new information sources and the behaviour of lead-
ing national TV channels. Attempts to suppress or counter anti-government narratives (by 
hacking websites, physical attacks on individuals, personnel changes and legislation) are de-
scribed and their impact assessed. The essay focuses on the period from late November to 
                                                 
1
 For example, allocating digital broadcasting licences to pro-government businesses; putting pressure on more 
critical or independent broadcasters through the courts or revoking their licences (see Freedom House 2012: 10–
12). 
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early February (i.e. before Yanukovych’s ousting). It concludes by identifying a number of 
potential avenues for future research. 
 
 
The Ukrainian media environment under Yanukovych, 2010–2013 
 
For years, the majority of leading national news providers in Ukraine have belonged to rival, 
privately-owned financial groups associated with prominent oligarchs. As things stood at the 
end of 2013, the big five media holdings were Inter Media (uaimg.com), 1+1 Media (me-
dia.1plus1.ua), Media Group Ukraine (mgukraine.com), StarLightMedia (starlightmedia.ua) 
and Ukrainian Media Holding (umh.com.ua). The main media resources within each holding 
and their principal owners are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Ukraine’s major media holdings and their owners 
 Main  
owner(s) 
TV channels  Publications Other media 
Inter Media  Dmytro Firtash 
Serhiy  
Lyovochkin 
Inter, NTN, 
K1, K2, Mega, 
Piksel, Zoom, 
Enter-Film 
 Websites 
associated 
with TV  
channels 
1+1 Media Ihor 
Kolomoys’kyy  
1+1, 2+2, 
TET, 
PLUSPLUS, 
Bigudi, 1+1 
International 
 UNIAN news 
agency, Glav-
red, Tele-
krytyka and 
websites asso-
ciated with TV 
channels 
Media Group 
Ukraine  
Rinat 
Akhmetov 
Ukrayina, 
NLO TV, 
Futbol 1, 
Futbol 2 and 
four regional 
TV channels 
Segodnya mass 
circulation daily 
Websites 
associated 
with TV chan-
nels and pub-
lications  
StarLightMedia  Viktor Pinchuk  Novyy Kanal, 
ICTV, STB, 
M1, M2 
Fakty i Kom-
mentarii mass 
circulation daily 
Websites 
associated 
with TV chan-
nels and pub-
lications 
Ukrainian  
Media Holding 
Serhiy 
Kurchenko 
Menu-TV (a 
cookery chan-
nel) 
Forbes 
Ukraine, 
Korrespondent, 
Komsomolskaya 
Pravda v 
Ukraine, 
Argumenty i 
Fakty v Ukraine 
Websites 
associated 
with publica-
tions 
Source: Joanna Szostek 
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These media-owning oligarchs impose limits on editorial policy within which their chan-
nels and publications must operate.
2
 Often, this has translated into favourable news coverage 
for the authorities. Some of the oligarchs have particularly close and longstanding ties to 
Yanukovych. Rinat Akhmetov established his business empire in Donetsk during the 1990s 
while Yanukovych was governor there; he has been a major supporter of the Party of Re-
gions. Serhiy Lyovochkin headed the Presidential Administration from February 2010 until 
January 2014; his business partner Dmytro Firtash has also provided the Party of Regions 
with substantial funds. Serhiy Kurchenko was little known before 2012 and his rise has been 
attributed to the Yanukovych ‘family’, a group of high-ranking officials who acquired office 
and wealth through their connections with Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr (Levinskii 2014). 
Pinchuk and Kolomoys’kyy sat somewhat further from Yanukovych’s inner circle – Pinchuk 
is known for being the son-in-law of former Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma and has 
cultivated the image of a reputable international philanthropist; Kolomoys’kyy kept a lower 
public profile and has backed various political forces in the past. Yet the formal and informal 
powers concentrated in the Ukrainian executive have always created high incentives for 
businessmen to fall in line behind the president, because those who defied or challenged the 
regime ran the risk of missing out in the allocation of state procurement contracts, losing tax 
breaks or suffering from selective law enforcement (D’Anieri 2011). 
Soon after Yanukovych assumed the presidency there were indications of media freedom 
eroding as the media tycoons aligned themselves with the new political leadership. Journal-
ists at Kolomoys’kyy’s 1+1 TV channel complained in May 2010 that censorship within the 
company was blocking reports critical of the authorities (Ukrayinska Pravda 2010). The same 
month, another group of journalists at Pinchuk-owned channel STB published an open letter 
protesting against the imposition of a new, ‘toothless’ information policy (focus.ua 2010). 
Two years after the presidential election, Freedom House suggested that political and busi-
ness influence on the media was on the rise along with corruption and the prevalence of 
‘sponsored’ (i.e. paid-for) news reports (Freedom House 2012: 10–12). Direct government 
control over the media was not common but the economic leverage enjoyed by the executive 
over the biggest media owners created a broadly favourable information climate for Yanu-
kovych. For the most part, negative news coverage of his administration and policies was 
restricted to outlets with small or medium rather than mass audiences, such as the newspa-
pers Zerkalo Nedeli, Den’, and Kommentarii; the magazine Ukrayinskyy Tyzhden’; the web-
sites Ukrayinska Pravda (pravda.ua.com) and Livhyy Bereh (lb.ua) and cable TV channel 
TVi.
3
 
                                                 
2
 In an interview conducted by the author in September 2011, one senior manager at a Ukrainian TV channel 
explained the situation as follows: ‘You might say [the owner] presses through his interests, or you might say he 
supports certain [political] forces. You might say lobbies... The channel reflects the interests of its owner in the 
majority of cases. I stress, in the majority of cases, since it is a media outlet and a media outlet has to be inter-
esting to a much wider circle of people than just the owner. Correspondingly, a number of topics arise which 
might be uninteresting or sometimes unpleasant to the owner, but they have to be reflected otherwise it will be 
uninteresting to the viewer… Yes, it’s a business. Yes, it’s a conduit for the owner’s interests. In accordance 
with this, the editorial policy is constructed.’ 
3
 TVi has been involved in various controversies since 2010. First it was stripped of broadcasting frequencies 
following the election of Yanukovych as president, then cable operators began to remove the channel from their 
basic subscription packages causing its audience to shrink. In 2012 TVi faced charges of tax evasion and was 
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The worry for Yanukovych, however, was that the oligarchs’ loyalty might waver when 
the next election came around. It is not unknown for Ukrainian tycoons to switch political 
sides (e.g. Kolomoys’kyy’s vacillating support for Yuliya Tymoshenko in 2008–09) or en-
courage their media to adopt a balanced stance, as Inter’s former owner Valeriy Khoroshkov-
skyy did in late 2012 (Kabachiy 2012). Awareness of the risks inherent in overdependence 
on oligarchs presumably motivated Yanukovych’s attempts from 2010 onwards to build a 
media arsenal of his own. The national state-owned channel UT-1 quickly became a mouth-
piece for the Presidential Administration and 2013 saw a number of media assets change 
hands, with rumours indicating that the Yanukovych ‘family’ was providing capital for the 
deals (Ligacheva 2013). 
Thus, the Ukrainian media environment prior to EuroMaidan was still pluralistic but sub-
ject to high and increasing levels of political interference. Television, used as a source of 
news ‘every day or most days’ by over 90 percent of Ukrainians, carried little content that 
might undermine Yanukovych. Critical journalism was tolerated but largely confined to 
newspapers and the internet, which in 2011 were sources of news ‘every day or most days’ 
for 30 percent and 22 percent of Ukrainians respectively (Broadcasting Board of Governors 
and Intermedia 2011). With the oligarchs toeing his line, Yanukovych’s position on the in-
formation front appeared comfortable – but appearances in this case turned out to be deceiv-
ing. 
 
 
Journalism during the protests and sources of the president’s vulnerability 
 
The manner in which the EuroMaidan protests began and developed underscored three criti-
cal and interlinked weak spots in the state authorities’ grip on the Ukrainian media environ-
ment. The first was dissent and activism among Ukraine’s professional journalist community. 
The second was the autonomous nature and increasing accessibility of online communica-
tion. The third was the sensitivity of media-owning oligarchs to public and international 
opinion. 
At the start of EuroMaidan, popular bloggers and independent journalists demonstrated 
their capacity to rapidly mobilize the Ukrainian public on a scale not previously seen or ex-
pected. As one observer commented, a journalist’s Facebook post on 21 November became 
‘a stone which triggered an avalanche in Ukrainian society’ (Savanevs’kyy 2013). The post 
ran: ‘We’re meeting at 22:30 under the Independence Monument. Dress warmly, bring um-
brellas, tea, coffee, a good mood and friends. Reposting would be most welcome!’ The jour-
nalist in question was Mustafa Nayem, who made his name on TV talk shows but more re-
cently has been contributing to the Ukrayinska Pravda website, amongst other projects. Some 
1,500 people turned out alongside Nayem for the first evening protest on 21 November 
(Ukrayinska Pravda 2013a). The success of this spontaneous rallying call has been widely 
attributed to the internet and the power of social networks to spread messages quickly. How-
                                                                                                                                                       
 
forced to repay the government a considerable sum. In 2013 it was the subject of a battle for ownership and a 
change of management at the channel prompted many of its journalists to quit in protest. 
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ever, the importance of individual civic activism by journalists and bloggers must also be 
recognized. Established, high-profile media personalities like Nayem have large numbers of 
Facebook friends and followers, putting them in a particularly strong position to generate 
initial momentum for social action. Nayem was reportedly the second most-followed indi-
vidual in Ukraine on Facebook in April 2013, and the most-followed by February 2014 
(Watcher 2014). Nayem spoke from the stage on the second day of Euromaidan, as did other 
familiar names from Ukraine’s online and print media – director of the Institute of Mass In-
formation Viktoriya Syumar, Radio Svoboda correspondent Vitaliy Portnykov and Serhiy 
Rahmanin from Zerkalo Nedeli (Sidorenko 2013). The blurring of boundaries between jour-
nalism and activism, between media professionals and civil society, is a striking feature of 
EuroMaidan. If Yanukovych thought that opposition journalists operating in the ‘less influen-
tial’, lower audience spheres of internet and print media posed little danger to his regime, 
their role in the events of late November may have changed his mind. 
Once the protests were in progress, the internet predictably continued to serve as a crucial 
resource for the anti-government demonstrators in a multitude of ways. The inability of 
Yanukovych and his circle to effectively stem or control online communications constitutes 
the second important weakness in their information defences. Social media helped to diffuse 
basic logistical information about the protests to potential participants. In one survey, 40 per-
cent of respondents said they had learned when and where to go from Facebook messages, 
although TV was credited by 48 percent (Onuch 2014). When violence was perpetrated 
against the protesters, social media were utilized to identify the individuals responsible and 
hold them to account (e.g. Facebook 2013a). Opposition community-building and creativity 
flourished online (BBC Monitoring 2013c). Dozens of groups supporting the protests were 
established on Facebook, as well as the Russian social networking sites VKontakte and Od-
noklassniki.
4
 Some were used to share protest slogans, placards and stickers (examples in-
clude www.facebook.com/strikeposter and www.facebook.com/hrom.sektor.euromaidan). A 
group of film directors, cameramen and script writers shot dozens of short videos about the 
protests and uploaded them to YouTube, where they garnered many thousands of views 
(#Babylon’13 2014). Protest songs went viral. One of the most popular musical compositions 
of EuroMaidan was ‘Vitya Ciao’, a ‘farewell song’ for Viktor (Vitya) Yanukovych with lyr-
ics denouncing Ukraine’s corrupt courts and brutal riot police (Golovetskiy 2013). The video 
clip was created with the help of a correspondent from Channel 5 TV, showing once again 
the overlap between journalism and activism. 
 
                                                 
4
 Anti-protest groups were set up too, but these were in the minority (see http://vesti.ua/strana/36022-samoj-
antimajdannoj-socsetju-okazalis-odnoklassniki). It is worth mentioning that Vkontakte experienced changes in 
ownership in January and March 2014, with Kremlin-friendly businessman Alisher Usmanov and his associates 
gaining a controlling stake (see www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/21849681/pavel-durov-prodal-svoyu-
dolyu-vo-v-kontakte-ivanu-tavrinu; www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-18/mail-ru-boosts-vkontakte-stake-to-
52-as-usmanov-tightens-grip.html). This does not appear to have led to any instances of censorship. However, 
founder of VKontakte Pavel Durov revealed in March that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) had 
asked the company to disclose personal details of the ‘organizers’ of Euromaidan support groups (see 
http://top.rbc.ru/politics/17/04/2014/918521.shtml). Durov refused to comply. He linked his sale of shares in 
Vkontakte to this ‘process’, but did not elaborate in detail. 
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Image 1. A screenshot from the Facebook page of ‘Hromads’kyy Sektor’ on 12 December 
2013 (photo is captioned ‘Good people smell the same’) 
 
Source: www.facebook.com/hrom.sektor.euromaidan (accessed 14 April 2014) 
 
Of course, the internet was also an important platform for continuous news reporting during 
EuroMaidan. At times of political turmoil and instability, consumption of news generally 
increases as citizens seek information and an understanding of events (Ball-Rokeach and 
DeFleur 1976). This tendency was certainly evident among Ukrainian internet users during 
the protests, with traffic to the country’s online news resources reaching ‘unprecedented’ 
levels (Savanevs’kyy 2013). By the end of January the average number of daily visitors to 
Ukrayinska Pravda, Ukraine’s most popular and long-established web publication, had 
topped 750,000 – roughly double its pre-protest readership (Liveinternet 2014). One survey 
found that for people aged 18 to 54 living in urban areas (cities of 50,000+), the internet was 
the main source of information about the protests – 83.7 percent of respondents were follow-
ing developments online, while 81.2 percent were following via TV programmes (Com-
ments.ua 2014).  
Large numbers of Ukrainians turned to recently created online news sources, most nota-
bly, low-budget internet broadcasters which used mobile devices to stream live footage of 
EuroMaidan to viewers. The most prominent project of this type was hromadske.tv, launched 
in summer 2013 by professional journalists including Mustafa Nayem, Dmytro Hnap, Serhiy 
Andrushko, Danylo Yanevskyy and Roman Skrypin (Lopatina 2013). Most of Hro-
madske.tv’s founders have extensive experience of working at major established channels; a 
core contingent used to work for TVi before its change in management. They set up Hro-
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madske.tv to challenge the hold of the billionaires over Ukraine’s TV airwaves – an aim 
which sounded far-fetched back in summer, but EuroMaidan generated a surge in demand for 
independent reporting on which Hromadske.tv successfully capitalized. By February it had 
over 150,000 YouTube subscribers and its uploaded videos had been viewed over 21 million 
times (YouTube 2014). The channel functions on a very limited budget. As of January it had 
received grants from the U.S. embassy, the Dutch embassy and the International Renaissance 
Foundation totalling roughly $140,000, but otherwise it was dependent on public donations 
and volunteers working for no pay. The amount of money it spends in a month is comparable 
to the amount spent by Inter or 1+1 on one evening news bulletin (Vorona 2014). 
 
Image 2. A screenshot from hromadske.tv’s live coverage of Maidan on 18 February 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: www.youtube.com/watch?v=dh3_1L9XO60 (accessed 14 April 2014) 
 
Besides Hromadske.tv, various other websites provided low-budget TV coverage of Euro-
Maidan (Mandryk 2014). Spilno.tv was similarly set up prior to the protests as a non-
commercial ‘public television’ initiative; it relies on donations and subscription fees for its 
funding. News channel Espreso.tv was launched in 2013 by Mykola Knyazhyts’kyy, MP 
from the opposition Bat’kivshchyna party and former director of TVi. Ukrstream.tv was es-
tablished by journalists to show live images of Independence Square without any commen-
tary (Korkodym 2014). Online video coverage of EuroMaidan by U.S.-funded Radio Svo-
boda proved popular; it had reportedly been accessed over 19 million times by 6 December 
(RFE/RL 2013).
5
 Thus, Ukrainian internet users who wished to watch what was going on in 
the centre of Kyiv had no shortage of options. A small army of ‘strimery’ (‘streamers’) fed 
live video back to these websites from smartphones and tablets that was almost impossible 
for the authorities to censor (Mel’nikova 2014). 
                                                 
5
 It is unclear how many of these viewers were Ukraine-based and how many were based elsewhere. 
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Efforts were made to hamper the opposition’s online communications. The e-mail and 
social network accounts of opposition figures came under attack from hackers spreading false 
information; victims included UDAR party leader Vitaliy Klitschko and his deputy, the press 
secretary of Bat’kivshchyna MP Yuriy Lutsenko and the press secretary of jailed opposition 
leader Yuliya Tymoshenko (Bulhak 2013). The latter, Maryna Soroka, complained that fake 
anti-EU e-mails were being sent from her address (Interfax-Ukraina 2013). The official web-
site of UDAR was hacked too and the Ukrainian servers of news website Censor.net were 
reportedly completely destroyed. In early December news websites Ukrayinska Pravda and 
Livyy Bereh were both forced temporarily offline; the websites of Zerkalo Nedeli and 5 
Kanal TV faced similar difficulties (Telekrytyka 2013a, Ukrayinska Pravda 2013b). Precise-
ly who stood behind these attacks cannot be determined but media speculation linked them to 
‘specialists from abroad, probably Russia’ hired by the law-enforcement and security forces 
(Byk 2013). For the sake of fairness it should be mentioned that the cyber warfare was not 
one-directional: the websites of the Ukrainian president, cabinet of ministers and Interior 
Ministry were briefly disabled by unknown assailants in the first week of the protests. 
Yet trying to curb oppositional internet activity was futile given the volume of infor-
mation and huge numbers of web-users involved. Little that happened on or around Maidan 
could escape being captured and disseminated, visually or verbally, by the giant ‘public eye’ 
created by thousands of smartphones. In this context, Ukraine’s established national broad-
casters could not ignore or misreport the protests without being recognised as government 
stooges. Their first reaction was to report fairly instead. The rally late on 21 November re-
ceived generous coverage in the next day’s news bulletins on all the leading oligarch-owned 
channels – Inter, 1+1, STB, ICTV and Ukrayina. Only state-owned UT-1 ignored the protest-
ers, choosing to focus instead on Prime Minister Azarov’s speech advocating closer ties with 
Russia (BBC Monitoring 2013a). When much larger demonstrations erupted on the weekend 
of 23–24 November, the oligarchs’ channels again ran lengthy reports on the story, making 
no attempt to downplay the scale of the protests or denigrate the participants. In contrast, UT-
1 suggested that the protest camps were being ‘abandoned’ due to rain and bad weather 
(BBC Monitoring 2013b). It seemed, somewhat surprisingly, that Firtash, Lyovochkin, 
Akhmetov, Kolomoys’kyy and Pinchuk were allowing their respective news providers to 
report EuroMaidan in a balanced way, without a pro-government or anti-opposition slant. 
The weekend of 30 November – 1 December saw the first violent crackdown by riot po-
lice. Inter, 1+1, STB, ICTV and Ukrayina all broadcast footage of the police brutality and 
condemned it. For example, Inter’s flagship evening bulletin on 30 November showed pro-
testers being beaten with batons by law enforcers in riot gear, as well as interviews with the 
bleeding and bandaged victims (Podrobnosti.ua 2013). The following Sunday, 8 December, 
Inter drew attention to the authorities’ failure to reach out to the protesters, start talks or pun-
ish those responsible for the violence. Its primetime evening bulletin was devoted almost 
entirely to the mass demonstrations and related developments, with coverage reflecting both 
official and opposition viewpoints (Podrobnosti.ua 2013). In one lengthy report roughly 
halfway through the 70-minute programme, Inter’s Moscow correspondent Larisa Zadorozh-
naya examined the distorted news coverage of EuroMaidan produced by Russian television, 
exposing its heavy bias against the protesters. A few days later, employees from Pinchuk-
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owned ICTV were pictured online preparing sandwiches for ‘revolutionaries’ on the square 
(Facebook 2013b). Throughout December, the protesters were portrayed in a largely sympa-
thetic light by all the oligarch-owned channels. News reports emphasized the festive, non-
violent atmosphere and community spirit on the square. 
 
Image 3. A screenshot from the 20:00 Podrobnosti news bulletin on Inter, which showed the 
violence of Berkut riot police against protesters in a negative light (the photo is captioned 
‘That’s how they defend their country’) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: http://podrobnosti.ua/videoarchive/2013/11/30/6787.html (accessed 14 April 2014) 
 
However, some of the oligarch-owned channels came in for criticism during the final two 
weeks of December for being unduly supportive towards the authorities’ position. Inter, 1+1 
and ICTV were all accused of ‘lulling viewers’ with reassurances in their 15 December week-
ly news roundups (Shapoval 2013). A week later, Ukrayina’s reporting of the economic as-
sistance deal signed with Russia was described as a ‘panegyric to Putin’ (Dovzhenko 2013). 
On 28 December the respected weekly broadsheet Zerkalo Nedeli reported that the oligarchs 
had been forced to ‘retract their claws’ because Maidan had failed to achieve tangible results 
(Mostovaya 2013). The message now emanating from the big commercial channels, as well 
as UT-1, was a message of pacification which largely avoided the attribution of blame, dilut-
ed the essence of the protesters’ demands and omitted key details that might undermine the 
authorities (Kuzyakin 2014a). For example, Inter, Ukrayina, ICTV and 1+1 all reported a 
brutal attack on opposition journalist Tetyana Chornovol on 25 December, yet they failed to 
explain clearly that she had been filming the estate of Interior Minister Zakharchenko the day 
before the incident. Later the same week, UT-1 and Inter gave credence to Interior Ministry 
claims that suspects in the case had links to opposition parties. 
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When the protest movement regained momentum after the New Year holidays, editorial 
divergence between channels owned by different oligarchs became increasingly apparent. 
Sunday 12 January saw the first mass rally of 2014 with crowds estimated at around 50,000 
(Polityuk and Zinets 2014). On Kolomoys’kyy’s 1+1 and Pinchuk’s ICTV the rally was the 
top news story that evening and both were sympathetic towards the demonstrators – ICTV 
described as them as fighting for their ‘right to a decent life’ (BBC Monitoring 2014a). In 
contrast, Inter gave the rally just a brief mention halfway through its bulletin and Ukrayina 
ignored it entirely. On 16 January a repressive package of laws was adopted by parliament. 
Inter and Ukrayina responded with reports that focused on the successful adoption of the 
2014 budget during the same parliamentary session (both channels showed cheering support-
ers of the Party of Regions welcoming ‘economic stability’). Opposition MPs were portrayed 
in a negative light, brawling and blocking the work of parliament (Sobytiya.tv 2014, Podrob-
nosti.ua 2014). ICTV and 1+1 also led with news about the budget, but their coverage was 
less tendentious and raised more questions about the controversial new restrictions on the 
right to protest (fakty.ictv.ua 2014, TSNa 2014). On Sunday 19 January another mass 
demonstration was held on Maidan. This time, serious clashes broke out as large crowds tried 
to reach parliament via Hrushevskyy Street, blocked by riot police. The violent unrest lasted 
for days and EuroMaidan suffered its first fatalities. Inter laid the blame at the feet of ‘ultra-
right activists’; one media observer suggested that Inter’s coverage was starting to resemble 
that of the Russian-state controlled channels (Kuzyakin 2014b). Kolomoys’kyy’s 1+1, on the 
other hand, accused the police of deliberately targeting journalists (TSN 2014b). Ukrayina 
and ICTV took a more careful, less overtly partisan line. Both broadcast shocking footage of 
Berkut riot police abusing a naked man in the snow on 23 January, as did 1+1, whereas Inter 
(like UT-1) ignored the incident (BBC Monitoring 2014b). At the end of January, a graphic 
appeared on the internet which sorted Ukrainian news sources into ‘black’ (distorted report-
ing) or ‘white’ (fair reporting). Inter and UT-1 were on the blacklist; 1+1 was among the 
‘white’ media; while Ukrayina, ICTV and STB were not mentioned – apparently their behav-
iour was too ambiguous to categorise (ZIK 2014). 
During the first two months of EuroMaidan there was thus inconsistency in the editorial 
stance of all Ukraine’s oligarch-owned channels. For roughly three weeks, Inter, 1+1, ICTV, 
STB and Ukrayina offered little overt support to the authorities and received praise for being 
atypically ‘objective’. Towards late December they all showed signs of being ‘reigned in’ 
and trying to appease their viewers. The escalation of violence in January saw their editorial 
lines diverge markedly: Inter backed the state, 1+1 supported the protesters and the others 
vacillated somewhere in between. 
This erratic behaviour reflects conflicting pressures to which the channels were subject 
during the protests and the varying reactions of their owners. Certain analysts have argued 
that after becoming president, Yanukovych alienated most of Ukraine’s established oligarchs 
by ‘steamrollering too many too fast’ in favour of his core loyalists, ‘the family’ (Åslund 
2012). It has also been suggested that the oligarchs ‘collectively’ wanted the EU Association 
Agreement to be signed (Robinson and Polityuk 2013) and objected to Yanukovych choosing 
to keep Yuliya Tymoshenko in jail at the expense of the deal with Brussels (Åslund 2012). 
Yet the oligarchs and their interests do not lend themselves easily to generalizations. Among 
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the main media tycoons, Kolomoys’kyy certainly came into conflict with ‘the family’ 
(Tyzhden.ua 2013), but Akhmetov and Firtash did extremely well for themselves under the 
Yanukovych presidency. Forbes Ukraina keeps a tally of the value of state tenders won by 
different businessmen since the start of 2012; Akhmetov tops the ranking of beneficiaries, 
just ahead of Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr, with Firtash some way behind in third place 
(Forbes.ua 2014). The claim that Akhmetov and Firtash might have been closet pro-
Europeans is undermined by the fact that both tycoons controlled large numbers of deputies 
in the Ukrainian parliament, estimated at around 50 and 30 respectively (Lutsevych 2014), 
who on 21 November failed to support legislation to release Tymoshenko, thus effectively 
scuppering the Association Agreement. The only media-owning oligarch to back the EU deal 
unequivocally was Petro Poroshenko (Poroshenko owns 5 Kanal, which is a popular news 
channel but has a much smaller audience share than Inter, 1+1, Ukrayina and ICTV). It there-
fore seems rather unlikely that the fair coverage given to EuroMaidan from late November to 
mid-December was some kind of oligarchic revolt against Yanukovych’s U-turn on Europe. 
A much more likely explanation is that the oligarchs were ‘buying themselves insurance for 
the future’ by providing an information platform for the opposition (Robinson and Polityuk 
2013). Distorting news coverage of the protests would not have been risk-free, and at times 
of instability it is sensible to hedge one’s bets. 
However, the TV channels subsequently came under pressure to change their reporting of 
the protests. For example, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council An-
driy Klyuyev reportedly instructed their chief editors to reduce coverage (lb.ua 2013). At 
Inter a new chain of command was introduced. On 16 December former governor of Sumy 
Region Yuriy Chmyr was appointed to the newly created position of deputy head of the Pres-
idential Administration responsible for ‘humanitarian development and communications is-
sues’. Head of the Presidential Administration and minority Inter shareholder Serhiy Ly-
ovochkin was thus effectively side-lined and his resignation was accepted on 17 January.
6
 
Media reports claimed Chmyr would report to media consultant Aleksandr Gurbich who had 
created an ‘information umbrella’ for Yanukovych when the latter was still governor in Do-
netsk (Mostovaya 2013). Gurbich in turn was said to answer to Yanukovych’s son Oleksandr 
(Kamenev and Nikolaenko 2014). By the end of December the senior management at Na-
tional Information Systems, the company which produces Inter’s news, had been replaced 
(Telekrytyka 2014). Several journalists left as well, and in January the entire editorial team 
behind Sunday night news programme ‘Podrobnosti Nedeli’ was asked to resign (Ryabchun 
and Sakova 2014). 
The personnel changes at Inter were effective in bringing the channel’s news coverage 
back ‘on message’ for Yanukovych. The $15 billion loan deal with Russia signed on 17 De-
cember may also have influenced the oligarchs’ decision to reign in their media as it ap-
peared to strengthen the president’s position. However, attempts to silence critical voices 
through repression were far less successful and indeed backfired on the authorities. For ex-
                                                 
6
 Lyovochkin first offered his resignation on 30 November after riot police attempted to disperse protesters on 
Maidan violently. His resignation was not accepted at that time. Lyovochkin was a long-term rival of Andriy 
Klyuyev, head of Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council, who was rumoured to be behind the violent 
crackdown (although those rumours themselves were rumoured to come from Lyovochkin). 
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ample, when dozens of journalists were badly beaten by riot police on 30 November – 1 De-
cember, shocking images of their bloodied, bandaged heads and broken limbs were widely 
disseminated both on TV and online (Censor.net.ua 2013). Far from cowing anyone into 
submission, such violence only added momentum to the protest movement. Almost 70 per-
cent of those on Maidan identified the authorities’ use of force as a reason for demonstrating 
(Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 2014). The attack on investigative journalist 
Tetyana Chornovol on 25 December similarly prompted public outrage. On 16 January par-
liament passed repressive laws which included a series of measures to control the media: 
prison terms were introduced for disseminating ‘extremist’ material (with the definition of 
extremism so vague as to cover almost anything); websites were required to register as mass 
media (and would face hefty fines and closure if they failed to do so); the president and par-
liament were given the right to replace members of the national broadcasting regulator with-
out any explanation (Sidorenko 2014). Yet these laws, which also limited the right to protest, 
lasted only two weeks. Their adoption helped to trigger an escalation in violence on the 
streets, including the first fatalities, so that by the end of January parliament was forced to 
repeal the laws in an attempt to calm things down. International pressure may also have 
played a role – the Americans reportedly threatened Rinat Akhmetov that all his U.S. and 
European assets would be frozen unless the laws were overturned (ZN.ua 2014). Akhmetov’s 
group in parliament accordingly backed their annulment. 
 
 
Summary and avenues for future research 
 
Prior to EuroMaidan, presidential control of the Ukrainian media environment still suffered 
from three important weaknesses. Dissent and activism was common among the professional 
journalist community; online communication was both accessible and autonomous; and me-
dia-owning oligarchs were far from indifferent about their public and international reputa-
tion. These three factors interacted with each other to undermine Yanukovych’s position. The 
autonomy of the online sphere gave opposition-minded journalists multiple platforms to dis-
seminate criticism of the government and calls for action to large numbers of people. Wide-
spread access to independent online news sources meant that any traditional broadcaster 
which deliberately omitted important information could be recognised as a stooge of the re-
gime. The oligarchs – fearing international sanctions as well as their own political and eco-
nomic fate if Yanukovych should fall – did not want to be seen as pro-regime propagandists. 
Therefore, they allowed Ukraine’s leading national broadcasters to present the protesters in a 
sympathetic light, at least for the first month, and to transmit images (including images from 
the internet) which Yanukovych would rather have suppressed. The president and his sup-
porters used various tactics to reassert their grip over the news agenda, from cyber attacks to 
physical attacks to personnel changes and repressive legislation. Personnel changes at Inter 
were somewhat effective, but attempts to stem the tide of anti-government communication 
online proved futile. Moreover, use of violence against journalists and the introduction of 
‘dictatorial’ laws only fuelled public outrage and brought more people out onto the streets. 
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This essay has provided a preliminary discussion of media developments during Euro-
Maidan, but many of the issues raised here require more extensive research. In particular, the 
extent of convergence/divergence between the established broadcasters and new online TV 
projects merits investigation – this could be assessed through more detailed analysis of media 
discourse. The essay touched only briefly upon ‘citizen journalists’ and the online creativity 
of grassroots activists; further study is required to understand their significance for political 
dynamics. Analysis of the Ukrainian case in a comparative context could aid the develop-
ment of theory about the media’s role at times of radical political change. Finally, it should 
be noted that this essay has focused only on domestic media developments. A more thorough 
study would also need to consider the information campaign waged in and against Ukraine 
by the Russian media. 
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